4. The Chapter 1 《道德經》首章

1973年所發現的馬王堆的版本和通行本的首章，有簡單和極重要的差異。馬王堆約比王弼早400年，應該是更接近老子的原本思考。馬王堆《道德經》的第一章，保留「恆」的特殊意義和「無、有」的對稱性。這樣的詮釋能顯示出老子的邏輯結構。我的分段如下：

1. 道可道也，非恆道也；名可名也，非恆名也。
2. 無、名萬物之始；有、名萬物之母。
3. 故 恆無、欲也以觀其所妙；恆有、欲也以觀其所徼。
4. 兩者同出，異名同謂。
5. 玄之又玄，眾妙之門。

《道德經》第一章描述萬物之間的關係。老子用此例，來表示我們心裡常用二元思考 (例如，「有」與「無」) 的邏輯，老子說明這個邏輯應該如何組合，才能完全反映出我們心裡能自然的思維。

Our analysis is based on the Mawangdui version (c. 190 bc) discovered in 1973. Chapter 1 of this version has a simple but very important difference from the traditional versions. Since the Mawangdui version is about 400 years older than the traditional versions, it should be closer to the original thinking of Laozi. The special meaning of Heng and the symmetry of Wu and Yu are preserved in the Mawangdui version.

With these, the logic structure may be clearly demonstrated. I use the following paragraph structure:

1. Tao may be spoken of, but it is not the Heng Tao;
   Name may be named, but it is not the Heng Name.
2. Wu names the origin of the myriad things;
   Yu names the mother of the myriad things.
3. However,
   In Heng Wu, we observe their mysterious appearances;
   In Heng Yu, we observe their fading boundaries.
4. Both appear simultaneously, as
   different manifestations of the same (Tao).
5. Profound upon profound,
   they are the gateways to all mysteries.

Chapter 1 of the Tao Te Ching describes our views on the relations of the myriad things. Laozi uses this chapter as an example to show the logic of our dualistic thinking (e.g. Wu and Yu). Laozi shows how we can construct the logic that can reflect the naturalness in our minds.